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According to the agency theory, debt brings discipline to management and 
therefore, one way of reducing agency costs is by increasing the level of 
indebtedness. Even though there are a number of specificities of banks as 
corporations, this agency theory postulate should still be valid. This research is 
motivated by the need to understand microeconomics of banking better, which 
could be especially rewarding in CEE countries where the issues of credit risk, bank 
capital and corporate governance are specific. Accordingly, by testing the 
disciplinary role of debt in Croatian banks, we contribute to the still scarce literature 
on bank governance in Croatia. We operationalise the research by first generating 
an efficiency measure, which we believe adequately represents management 
efforts and ability to maximize the value of owners’ investment. In the next step, we 
explore the relation between banks' efficiency and leverage. Our results do not 
indicate that debt generally creates a discipline mechanism for bank managers in 
Croatia. 
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Introduction 
The asymmetry of information between owners and management is perhaps more 
pronounced in the banking industry than in other sectors. Bank managers have 
access to far more information about the clients and the bank itself than bank 
owners do. At the same time, access to public safety nets makes the question of 
information asymmetry even more sensitive. Having that in mind, it should come as 
no surprise that banks are highly regulated with their capital levels monitored closely. 
Besides the “physics” behind the monitoring of optimal capital levels in terms of risk 
management, little attention is usually paid to the “chemistry” of the relationship 
between bank owners and the ones making the every-day decision on optimal 
levels of leverage in terms of maximising bank's profits. 
The question of capital structure and agency costs in banking industry is also 
important from the perspective of the whole economy, as this industry provides 
credit to the real sector and therefore enhances economic growth. However, this 
issue is even more important in banking sectors of CEE countries where the pressure 
on bank capital is increased due to higher credit and market risks. In addition, banks 
in CEE countries are predominantly foreign owned with large international financial 
groups usually holding the majority of banking sector capital. Therefore, the 
determination of foreign owners to keep their investment in CEE banks is usually 
monitored with care, especially in crisis years. 
Like most of the CEE banking sectors, foreign financial institutions that hold around 
90% of banking sector assets predominately own Croatian banking sector. In 
addition, the banking sector is becoming more concentrated with the departure of 
smaller and usually domestically owned banks, mostly via mergers. The capital ratios 
in Croatian banking sector are high with total capital ratio amounting to 20.9% at 
end 2015. The major contributor to the increase in banks' capital adequacy after 
2008 is the decrease of risk weighted assets, with the capital levels remaining high 
due to the relatively high retained earnings, while recapitalisations in form of inflow 
of fresh capital were generally absent from 2008 onwards. 
Given the importance of bank capital and the potential of agency theory in 
helping to explain the relationship between managers and owners, the lack of 
research so far on agency theory in Croatian banking sector context, seems 
unjustified. In addition, with banks deleveraging towards their foreign owners in 
Croatia after 2008 it becomes interesting to question whether debt disciplines bank 
managers. We therefore contribute to the literature on Croatian banking sector and 
agency theory in banking by testing whether increased leverage disciplines 
managers as the agency theory would suggest, causing the reduction in agency 
costs. 
After introduction and literature overview, we explain the rationale for using bank 
specific profit efficiency measure derived from Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), 
which consists of cost and revenue efficiency. The advantage of this measure 
compared with financial ratios or indicators derived from stock market is that it can 
control for firm-specific factors outside the control of management that are not part 
of agency costs (Berger and di Patti, 2006). After this step, we explain data and 
methodology and proceed by testing the connection between bank leverage and 
profit / cost / revenue efficiency using a Panel Tobit regression. After presenting the 
results, we conclude and offer recommendation of further research. 
All of the calculations are carried out in R programming language with the help of 
Benchmarking package developed by Bogetoft and Otto (2015). In the next step, 
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Literature overview 
One of the pillars of agency theory is financing structure dilemma. As Dobbin and 
Jung (2010) suggest, the agency cost associated with turning over management to 
non-owners stems from three propensities of management: a) to sacrifice profitability 
as to minimize the risk of firm failure, b) to over-reward themselves and drain profits 
and c) pursue short-term strategies that will benefit management rather than long-
term strategies that will benefit shareholders. Accordingly, there are three strategies 
available in order to reduce agency costs: a) turning management into 
shareholders, b) forcing management to pay dividends, which will force them to 
issue new stock to open themselves up to additional shareholder monitoring and c) 
according to Jensen and Meckling (1976), take on debt. Debt should moderate the 
conflict of interests between shareholders and managers because managers would 
take on debt only when they are convinced that they can achieve rates of return 
that exceed cost of debt. Therefore, shareholders should prefer firm using debt as it 
shows that management is convinced that new projects will pay off. Shareholders 
would also prefer debt financing to new stock issuance as it could multiply their 
potential returns. 
The relationship of capital structure and firm performance is often the subject of 
research. The foundations for this topic were laid down by Modigliani and Miler 
(1958), Modigliani and Miler (1963), Myres (1977), Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Grossman and Hart (1982). Even though these papers managed to establish the 
relationship between leverage and performance, and popularize the agency topic 
in general, they were conducted from the perspective of non-financial companies. 
Even though banks and financial corporations in general are highly leveraged and 
strictly regulated, according to the agency theory, increasing leverage should 
provide discipline for their managers as well. Work of Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti 
(2006) represents a significant empirical and methodological contribution to the 
literature of agency costs of debt in banking sector. Using a comprehensive 
methodology and custom-made indicator of bank profit efficiency, based on 
Distribution-free approach, authors show that agency costs are lower when bank 
leverage is increased. Similar methodology was applied on Australian deposit takers 
by Skopjak and Luo (2012) who concluded that on lower levels of leverage 
increasing leverage contributes to the higher profit efficiency of banks, however, 
consistent with the theory, on higher end of leverage distribution, increasing 
leverage increases the financial distress costs and outweighs the gains from 
increased managerial effort. Admati and Hellwig (2013) discuss the bank leverage 
from the long-term social welfare stance and conclude that leverage should be 
lower. 
As Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) mention, empirical evidence on the 
agency costs hypothesis in financial literature is inconclusive. Most of the tests rely on 
finding the relationship between firm performance and capital (or leverage) levels 
and other control variables. However, inability of researchers to create a universal 
measure of manager’s effort often leads to the inconsistent results. A part of these 
inconsistencies comes from using a sub-optimal variable for measuring manager’s 
effort: either ratios derived from financial statements (like simple return on assets) or 
stock market data (like stock market returns). Simple profitability ratios, like ROA as 
well as stock market returns cannot separate managerial effort from other 
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Measuring bank performance 
Our research goal requires a measure of managerial effort in running a bank. We do 
not use profitability ratios (like ROA, ROE) because we believe that they do not show 
managerial effort correctly, as they depend on many different factors that are not 
under managerial influence. The most important driver of bank profitability in crisis is 
credit risk (via impairment costs arising from the increased levels of non-performing 
loans). However, it is not obvious which part of the loan portfolio should be attributed 
to the current management decisions and which belongs in the legacy domain. In 
addition, those profitability measures are dependent of the economies of scale and 
the prices each bank faces which are not totally under control of the management. 
Therefore, we believe that more appropriate indicator for our research is 
efficiency measure that will consider the prices the banks are facing as exogenous. 
Having this in mind, we are faced with the choice between two approaches of 
estimating banks' profit efficiency, more concretely between linear programming 
DEA method and parametric frontier analysis by means of SFA method. However, 
parametric frontier analysis is more data demanding which would lead to fewer 
observations in our case. We therefore, use Data envelopment analysis to derive 
bank specific profit efficiency measure that consists of cost and revenue efficiency. 
Our bank-specific efficiency calculation is implemented in four steps. First, we 
calculate optimal (maximal) attainable revenue for each bank, based on the 
observed prices of banks’ outputs and their selected combination of outputs. 
Secondly, based on the observed costs of inputs Croatian banks use in production 
process and their selected combination of outputs, we calculate optimal (minimal) 
attainable costs. Thirdly, given the evaluated optimal revenues and expenses, we 
calculate optimal attainable profit for every observed bank, which is used as 
benchmark and compared to observed banks’ profits in the calculation of profit 
efficiency. Finally, we use the profit efficiency as a measure of banks’ performance, 
where the appearance of inefficiency is to a certain extent attributed to the 
existence agency costs. 
Optimal revenues are calculated using the DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) 
method that employs techniques of linear programming in order to find the 
combination of outputs, which maximises banks’ revenues while simultaneously 
assuring that the estimated combination of outputs can be attained, by the 
observed bank. Optimal costs are calculated using the same linear programming 
techniques by estimating the combination of inputs that minimises costs of banks’ 
production process. This method is viewed as optimal due to its flexibility, which arises 
from the fact that as a nonparametric method it requires significantly less a priori 
model assumptions and does not request explicit mathematical form specification of 
the production function that is often a challenging proposition when banks are 
observed. Additionally, it is capable of handling multiple input, multiple output 
characterisations of production processes and enables quantification of inefficiency 
for every evaluated unit. Notable characteristic of DEA model is that it is 
deterministic and therefore it ignores the presence of random noise in data and it 
assumes that every variation in data carries some information about inefficiency of 
observed bank. This feature of DEA method should be taken into account when 
selecting input and outputs of production as any random variation in the data would 
be reflected in the efficiency measure. It should be also mentioned that DEA based 
efficiency measures are upward biased due to the fact that it estimates an empiric 
frontier composed of observed values of other banks and therefore it could be lower 
than theoretical frontier that is theoretically possible to attain. In multiple input - 
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practice) for every observed bank using the extreme point method which lies on the 
assumption that if one bank can produce a certain level of outputs from a certain 
level of inputs, then any other bank of similar size would also be able to do so. If we 
allow the creation of composite banks from existing ones (by including the convexity 
assumption), then we are able to construct the frontier for every possible 
combination of inputs and outputs. Efficiency measure will be estimated by 
comparing the observed input-output combination of each bank with its frontier 
solution. 
As Table 1 shows, we observe bank as entity that transforms inputs (funds, labour 
and physical assets) into outputs (gross loans and investments) under the various 
circumstances using various money intermediation practices and different long-term 
"production" strategies. In other words, we view bank's business process as a "black 
box" where we can measure inputs, outputs and external factors while the very 
mechanics of production process remains unknown. In that context, we will define 
bank b,(b = 1, … , K) as an ordered set of its inputs and outputs (Equation 1): 
Bankb = (xb, yb),  xb ∈ ℝ+
3 , yb ∈ ℝ+
2 , (1) 
where K is a number of banks present in the market at observed time period (year). 
 
Table 1 Variables used in calculation 
Variable Name Description 
Input 1(𝑥1) Labour Number of employees 
Input 2 (𝑥2) Physical assets Physical assets reported on bank’s balance sheet 
Input 3 (𝑥3) Funds (financing resources) Deposits and short term credits 
Output 1 (𝑦1) Gross loans Loans before impairments and write-offs 
Output 2 (𝑦2) Investments Other assets (total ass. less gross loans and fixed ass.) 
Cost 1(𝑐1) Cost of labour Wage per employee 
Cost 2 (𝑐2) Amortisation Amortisation of physical assets 
Cost 3 (𝑐3) Interest expenses Interest expense per unit of funds 
Price1 (𝑝1) Interest income Interest income per unit of gross loans 
Price 2 (𝑝2) Other non-interest income Other non-interest income per unit of investments 
Source: Authors’ depiction. 
 
Every DEA based analysis of efficiency and production possibilities is founded on 
the notion of production technology that gives us insight on how are inputs and 
outputs related, how we can substitute one input with another, or how level of 
outputs depends on level of inputs. The basic assumption of efficiency analysis is 
based on the notion that all banks share mutual technology that is defined by 
technology set (Equation 2): 
T = {(x, y) ∈ ℝ+
m × ℝ+
n  | x can produce y}, (2) 
where m is number of inputs and n is number of outputs used in production process. 
It can be seen from the definition of technology set that it contains the all of the 
observed values that banks realized in the observed period. In order to make relative 
comparison of banks with their theoretical frontier, technology set will be expanded 
by including two additional properties: free disposability of inputs and outputs and 
convexity. Free disposability property assumes that banks can discard unnecessary 
inputs as well as unwanted outputs for free. Convexity property assumes that if two 
different production technologies are accessible than every linear combination of 
those technologies is also accessible. 
In order to make comparison of banks of different sizes, technology set has to 
satisfy returns to scale assumption that can be defined in general terms as 
γ−returns to scale shown in Equation 3: 





Croatian Review of Economic, Business and Social Statistics (CREBSS) 
UDK: 33;519,2; DOI: 10.1515/crebss; ISSN 1849-8531 (Print); ISSN 2459-5616 (Online) 
 
 
Vol. 3, No. 1, 2017, pp. 45-62 
 
where Γ(γ) is a set of possible scaling factors that depends on the choice of 
scaling possibilities. Our model will use the variable returns to scale (VRS) assumption 
whereΓ(γ) = {1}. Therefore, the technology set will be defined as in Equation 4: 
T = {(x, y) ∈ ℝ+
m × ℝ+
n  | x ≥ ∑ λkxk
K
k=1






= 1, λk ≥ 0,  k = 1, … , K}. (4) 
First question that we need to address is to estimate how much revenue each 
bank would be able to generate if it was revenue efficient, given their observed 
inputs mix. To assess the possible improvement in terms of income generated by 
outputs, we need to include the price dimension into consideration. We assume that 
the prices of individual outputs in the given year are the same for all banks in the 
sample and are equal to observed income generated per unit of output on 
aggregate level. We can therefore for bank b (b = 1, … , K) estimate the optimal 
revenue that is attainable within the technology T in the year 𝑡 (𝑡 = 1994, … ,2015), by 
solving the following linear programming (LP) problem with 𝐾 + 2 variables (as 
depicted in Equations 5-8): 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑦1,𝑡,𝑦2,𝑡,𝜆1,…,𝜆𝐾 𝑟𝑡
𝑏 = 𝑝1,𝑡 ∙ 𝑦1,𝑡 + 𝑝2,𝑡 ∙ y2,t, (5) 
𝑠. 𝑡.   𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑏 ≥ ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑘𝐾
𝑘=1 ,    𝑖 = 1,2,3;   𝑡 = 1994, … ,2015, (6) 
𝑦𝑗,𝑡 ≤ ∑ 𝜆
𝑘𝑦𝑗,𝑡
𝑘𝐾
𝑘=1 ,    𝑗 = 1,2, 𝑡 = 1994, … 2015 , (7) 
∑ 𝜆𝑘𝐾𝑘=1 = 1, 𝜆
𝑘 ∈ ℝ+, (8) 
where 𝑝𝑗,𝑡 , (𝑗 = 1,2) is a price of output 𝑦𝑗 in the year t, 𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  is observed level of input I 
of the bank k in the year t, 𝑦𝑗,𝑡
𝑘  is observed level of output j of the bank k in the year t. 
In this linear problem, we maximise goal function, which measures optimal revenues 
attainable within the technology T. It is ensured that the bank b is able to produce 
revenue-optimal combination of outputs ?̃?𝑡
𝑏 by requiring that (𝑥𝑡
𝑏 , ?̃?𝑡
𝑏) ∈ 𝑇 which is 
secured by conditioning that there is a convex combination of observed production 
plans that (weakly) dominates revenue-optimal production plan (𝑥𝑡
𝑏 , ?̃?𝑡
𝑏) of bank b. 
Possible improvements on the cost side for bank 𝑏 (b = 1, … , K) in the year 𝑡 (𝑡 =
1994, … ,2015), are calculated in the same way, by solving LP problem that finds 
optimal cost-minimising input combination ?̃?𝑡
𝑏that is able to produce observed 
output mix𝑦𝑡
𝑏 (as depicted in Equations 9-12): 
min𝑥1,𝑡,𝑥2,𝑡,𝑥3,𝑡,𝜆1,…,𝜆𝐾 𝑐𝑡
𝑏 = 𝑐1,𝑡 ∙ 𝑥1,𝑡 + 𝑐2,𝑡 ∙ 𝑥2,𝑡 + 𝑐3,𝑡 ∙ 𝑥3,𝑡, (9) 
𝑠. 𝑡.   𝑥𝑖,𝑡 ≥ ∑ 𝜆
𝑘𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑘𝐾
𝑘=1 ,    𝑖 = 1,2,3, 𝑡 = 1994, … 2015, (10) 
𝑦𝑗,𝑡
𝑏 ≤ ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝑦𝑗,𝑡
𝑘𝐾
𝑘=1 ,    𝑗 = 1,2, 𝑡 = 1994, … ,2015, (11) 
∑ 𝜆𝑘𝐾𝑘=1 = 1, 𝜆 ∈ ℝ+
𝐾, (12) 
where 𝑐𝑖,𝑡, (𝑖 = 1,2,3) is a price of output 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 in the year t, 𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  is observed level of input I 
of the bank k in the year t, 𝑦𝑗,𝑡
𝑘  is observed level of output j of the bank k in the year t. 
By combining optimal levels of revenues ?̃?𝑡
𝑏 and costs ?̃?𝑡
𝑏 and comparing them to 
observed levels of revenues and costs, we can calculate the optimal profit (Equation 
13) ?̃?𝑡




𝑏 . (13) 
Furthermore, by comparing the observed profit 𝑝𝑡
𝑏 with the optimal profit ?̃?𝑡
𝑏 bank 
could have attained, we can create a measure of profit efficiency (Equation 14) of 














𝑏denotes the revenues of the bank b in year t and 𝑐𝑡
𝑏denotes the costs of the 
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Data and methodology 
Our initial sample for research is an unbalanced panel of 72 banks over 22 years 
(1994 - 2015) making 904 observations overall, which was after the exclusion of outlier 
observations reduced to 825 observations. Out of 72, 26 banks were present on the 
market at the end of 2015, out of which 23 banks were present in the whole sample. 
The data is collected from statistical and supervisory reports gathered by the 
Croatian National Bank. The number of banks in the sample decreases over time, 
with the biggest reduction recorded at the beginning of the sample in late nineties 
when the banking crisis occurred. After 2002, the decrease in the number of banks is 
continuous but steady and was mostly the result of merger activities during the still 
ongoing process of market consolidation. Therefore, after 2002, the structure of the 
banking system and our sample remained relatively stable with concentration levels 
similar to today’s levels and with foreign institutions owning around 90% of the 
banking sector total assets. 
Having a comprehensive measure of bank profit efficiency allows us to test 
agency theory also by using its elements separately: revenue efficiency and cost 
efficiency. Finally, it should be mentioned that finding the statistically significant 
connection between leverage and bank efficiency is not enough to test the agency 
cost of debt, but that relationship should also be tested on different levels of 




Our set of independent variables can be grouped into four categories (Table 2). 
Banks specific variables describe individual bank data that we believe can influence 
profit efficiency. Profit efficiency (PREFF) is our dependent variable calculated from 
DEA. Leverage (LEVER) shows the ratio of deposits and short-term loans to total assets 
and represents our main independent variable. According to agency theory, the 
estimated coefficient related to this variable should be positive, as greater leverage 
should discipline managers’ to act more in sync with shareholders’ expectations and 
therefore increase banks' profit efficiency. In addition, we expect that higher credit 
risk (CR_RISK) should motivate efficiency, as management might want to support 
profitability with efficiency gains to protect the capital burdened with loan losses. 
Finally, we include bank size (LN_SIZE) measured as natural logarithm of assets, as we 
expect larger banks to be more profit efficient as they can benefit from economies 
of scale but also have more resources available to form a superior business strategy.  
Structural and macro variables represent exogenous variables influencing profit 
efficiency. Herfinhal-Hirschman index (HHI) measures the concentration level of a 
certain market with sum of squared market shares for each company. We expect 
HHI to negatively influence bank profit efficiency as higher concentration decreases 
the competition and reduces the need of managers to extract maximum effort. 
Although it would be possible to calculate market power measures, it should be 
noted that the majority of market power measures (like Lerner index) include 
profitability, which could cause endogeneity problem. GAP represents the 
difference between actual and potential economic growth. We expect negative 
relationship between GAP and cost efficiency and positive between GAP and 
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Table 2 Variables used in the model estimation 
Symbol Definition Exp. sign Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable 
PREFF 
Profit efficiency (closeness of a bank to the most 
profit efficient bank on the market) (rel.) 
 
0.41 0.36 -0.92 1.00 
REFF 
Revenue efficiency (closeness of a bank to the 
most revenue efficient bank on the market) (rel.) 
 
0.71 0.19 0.14 1.00 
CEFF 
Cost efficiency (closeness of a bank to the most 
cost efficient bank on the market) (rel.) 
 
0.74 0.20 0.19 1.00 
Inputs for calculating PREFF, CEFF, REFF 
EMPL 
Labour input calculated as: number of employees 
(abs.) 
 465.69 884.33 5.00 4715.00 
FUNDS 
Funds input calculated as: deposits and short-term 
loans (ln abs.) 
 13.53 1.93 7.17 18.19 
PHY_AS 
Physical assets input calculated as: assets with 
physical dimension ( ln abs.) 
 10.14 1.71 1.79 14.04 
PR_FUN 
Price of funds calculated as: interest costs / 
(deposits + short-term loans) (rel.) 
 0.06 0.24 0.00 7.23 
PR_LAB 
Price of labour calculated as: cost of labour / 
number of employees (rel.) 
 131.93 68.41 0.00 1191.26 
PR_PHY 
Price of physical assets: depreciation / physical 
assets (rel.) 
 0.24 0.52 0.00 9.06 
LOANS 
Total granted loans calculated as: gross loans (net 
loans + loan loss reserves) (ln abs.) 
 13.43 1.87 5.46 18.17 
INV 
Investments calculated as: all bank assets besides 
physical assets and loans (ln abs) 
 12.85 1.95 6.34 17.40 
Explanatory variables in efficiency model 
Bank specific variables 
LEVER 
Leverage indicator calculated as: (total deposits 
and total short-term loans) / total assets (rel.) 
+ 
0.80 0.17 0.00 1.01 
LEVER_SQ Square of LEVER +/- 0.34 0.10 0.00 0.51 
CR_RISK 
Credit risk (total value adjustments to total assets) 
(rel.) 
+ 
0.02 0.04 -0.12 0.59 
LN_SIZE Natural logarithm of bank assets (ln abs.) + 13.83 1.85 8.79 18.49 
Structural and macro variables 
HHI 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of bank assets 
concentration calculated as sum of squared 
market shares in each year (abs.) 
- 
0.13 0.02 0.00 0.16 
DUM_1998 
Dummy variable indicating the year 1998 when 
banking sector recorded significant losses as a 
result of banking crisis (bin.) 
+/- 
0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
DUM_2015 
Dummy variable indicating the year 2015 when as 
a result of Swiss franc loan conversion banking 
sector recorded significant losses and as a result 
leverage increased (bin.) 
+/- 
0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
GAP 
Log of output gap calculated as: log ((absolute 
value of lowest real GDP growth rate in whole 
sample) + real GDP growth in a year)) (ln rel.) 
+/- 
0.10 0.03 0.00 0.14 
Governance related variables 
DUM_OWN 
Dummy variable indicating that bank is managed 
by owners (bin.) 
+ 
0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 
DUM_DIS 
Dummy variable indicating that the ownership of 
bank equity is disperse (bin.) 
- 
0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
DUM_FOR 
Dummy variable indicating that bank is foreign 
owned (bin.) 
+/- 
0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
DUM_GOV 
Dummy indicating that bank is government owned 
(bin.) 
+/- 
0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Source: Authors’ depiction. 
 
Dummy variables for 1998 and 2015 are included because banking sector 
recorded significant losses in those rather specific years: in 1998 due to the banking 
crisis and in 2015 due to the Swiss franc conversion. Those specific one-off events 
might have triggered managers to increase efforts and perhaps deviate from usual 
effort. We do not include dummy variable for the year 2008, as beginning of the 
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shown in Figure A1 in Appendix). Finally, governance related variables represent a 
vector of dummy variables explaining bank characteristics that could possibly 
influence agency costs. We expect that banks that are being run by owners have 
higher profit efficiency, as by definition in theory, they have no agency costs. On the 
other hand, in case that the ownership of bank is dispersed, and all shareholders 
have 25% or less equity, we expect agency costs to be higher and therefore PREFF 
lower. We also expect that owners residency could be a factor in bank PREFF and 
we therefore include a dummy variable for foreign and government owned banks, 
as we expect that foreign owners possess the business know-how which enables 




We test agency costs hypothesis by regressing bank specific profit efficiency on the 
leverage indicator and other control variables (Equation 15): 
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽 ∙ 𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (15) 
where 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 is a measure of bank i`s profit, cost or revenue efficiency in the year t, 𝛽 
is a vector of coefficients, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control variables observed in year t for the 
bank i and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a normally distributed error term (𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)) (Table A2 in Appendix 
shows the correlation matrix between control variables). 
Having in mind that our dependent variable is censored and can reach a 
maximum value of 1 and that there is a noticeable number of observations that, due 
to the construction of DEA model, take that border value, we employ a censored 
regression linear model proposed by Tobin (1958) which is more known as Tobit 
model. Tobit model is designed to estimate linear relationship between variables 
when there is censoring in the dependent variable. In our case, data can take 
values of 1 and less, therefore, our data is left censored or censored from bellow 
(Equation 16). It supposes that there is a latent variable ?̅?𝑖𝑡 that linearly depends on 
𝑥𝑖𝑡: 
?̅?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,, (16) 
and which can define the dependant variable of the model as in Equation 17: 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 = {
?̅?𝑖𝑡    𝑖𝑓 ?̅?𝑖𝑡 < 1
1   𝑖𝑓 ?̅?𝑖𝑡  ≥ 1
. (17) 
Parameters of the model (𝛽) are estimated by the maximum likelihood (ML) 
method which maximises the log-likelihood function. Assuming that the disturbance 
term 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance𝜎2, the log-likelihood 
function is defined as in Equation 18: 
ℓ(𝛽, 𝜎2) = ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔Φ (
𝑥𝑖𝑡∙𝛽𝑡−1
𝜎
) +𝑖:𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡=1 ∑ [𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜙 (
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡−𝑥𝑖𝑡∙𝛽𝑡
𝜎
) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎]𝑖:𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡<1 , (18) 
where 𝜙(∙) and Φ(∙) denote the probability density function and the cumulative 
distribution function of the standard normal distribution. 
 
Results 
Standard bank performance indicators reveal that Croatian banking sector went 
through three different periods from 1994 onwards (Figure A1 in Appendix). The first 
period from 1994 to 1999 was characterised by high volatility in bank market 
structure as the number of banks initially increased and reached 60 in 1997. 
However, with the increase in the number of banks, the number of problems within 
the banking sector accumulated, which was masked with high interest rates that 
provided temporary shelter for banks with lower efficiency and inferior credit risk 
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to around -2% and subsequently triggering the process of market cleansing. In the 
second period, 2000-2008, banking sector enjoyed a period of moderation as profits 
were reasonably high (ROA 1.4% on average) and losses related to credit risk were 
relatively low as the rigorous process of reclassification of loan portfolio from the crisis 
of 1998 created a solid basis for following growth. The number of banks continued to 
decrease, primarily as a result of market consolidation. Also, net interest margin 
stabilized in this period at levels around 2.5% to 3.0%, comparable with today’s level. 
Finally, in years 2009-2015 the financial crisis left its mark on the banking sector with 
credit risk costs increasing from 2008 onwards. Unlike the crisis in late 90’s, credit 
losses were initially lower but the process lasted longer which was caused by 
prolonged period of slow economic activity. In 2015, credit losses increased further 
with Swiss franc conversion costs bringing ROA to the levels even lower than the ones 
recorded in the period of bank crisis at around -1.5%. 
Our measure of banks’ profit efficiency is not that volatile as ROA as the majority 
of profitability dynamics comes from credit risk and other activities not under direct 
influence of management decisions (Figure 1). On average, from 1994 to 2015 
aggregate bank profit efficiency did increase from around 60% to around 80%. This 
means that banking sector managed to generate just 60% of profits that most 
efficient bank on market could achieve controlling for the size and prices. By 2015, 
this ratio increased to 80% reflecting improvements in efficiency. It should be noted 
that mean profit efficiency also increased by around 20 percentage points, starting 
at around 30% in 1994 and finishing around 50% in 2015, mean profit efficiency 
amounted to 40% most of the time. 
In the same time, the leverage of banks was more stable and with far less 
differences between banks. The volatility of leverage indicator in late nineties is a 
reflection of instability caused by banking crisis as leverage increased when banks 
faced losses and saw their capital decrease (histogram of bank leverage is given in 
Figure A2 in Appendix). After 1998, bank leverage recorded a period of growth that 
was interrupted by two years of stronger recapitalisations (2006 and 2008). After 
2008, there were no recapitalisations, and with domestic deposits continuing to 
grow, leverage was increasing. In 2015, due to high costs of Swiss franc loans 
conversion, leverage increased as recognised losses decreased bank capital. 
Our results show that the higher leverage ratio is generally associated with lower 
profit efficiency which is in contrast with the Agency theory (Table 3). Our results are 
consistent and robust in all model specifications. In our full specifications model, 1 
percentage point increase in leverage would in fact lead to decrease of bank profit 
efficiency by 1.1 percentage points. Bank size is a positive determinant of profit 
efficiency as size allows banks more manoeuvring space. Regarding the structural 
and macro variables, higher market concentration, measured with HHI, is negatively 
connected with profit efficiency which is in line with the quiet-life hypothesis. 
Regarding governance related variables, profit efficiency seems to be positively 
connected with owners running the bank, which is in line with the agency theory. In 
fact, if owners take full control of the company, then agency costs should by 
definition amount 0. Also, disperse ownership is as expected negatively connected 
with profit efficiency. Finally, foreign ownership seems to be positively contributing to 
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Figure 1 Efficiency measures and leverages (weighted mean) 
Legend: LEVER – leverage, REFF – Revenue efficiency, PREFF – Profit efficiency, CEFF – Cost 
efficiency  
Source: Authors’ calculation based on HNB data. 
 
Having a comprehensive measure of bank efficiency (profit efficiency) allows us 
to use its components for testing the agency cost of debt (Table 4). The rationale for 
this approach is the fact that bank revenue efficiency is less under the control of 
bank managers than bank cost efficiency. Although our measures are designed not 
to include credit risk materialisation in revenue efficiency considerations, credit risk is 
still present as lower credit quality decreases interest income. It is due to this reason 
why the majority of bank efficiency research actually refers to the bank cost 
efficiency calculation. 
 
Table 3 Econometric model results for profit efficiency 
 






LEVER -0.935**   -1.070*** 
LEVER_SQ -0.423   0.171 
CR_RISK 0.679*   0.475 
LN_SIZE 0.153***   0.136*** 
HHI  -1.575  -1.444 
DUM_1998  -0.022  0.061 
DUM_2015  0.11  0.065 
GAP  -0.850*  0.908** 
DUM_OWN   0.075* 0.123*** 
DUM_DIS   -0.164*** -0.095*** 
DUM_FOR   0.312*** 0.138*** 
DUM_GOV   0.156*** 0.05 
CONSTANT -0.821*** 0.705*** 0.329*** -0.631*** 
Statistics     




0.31 0.01 0.20 0.37 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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As expected, judging by the multiple correlation coefficients, model explaining 
revenue efficiency has lower goodness of fit compared with model explaining cost 
efficiency. Overall sample the leverage has a significant negative sign, however 
according to the theory, this relationship is not necessarily linear and therefore, we 
also use squared value of leverage. The square value of leverage has a significant 
positive sign indicating that the relationship between leverage and cost efficiency 
indeed is not linear and that the relationship changes at very high leverage. 
Therefore, after certain point, increasing the leverage is connected with the increase 
of cost efficiency. 
 
Table 4 Econometric model results for cost and revenue efficiency 
 









Governance Full model 
LEVER -0.720***   -0.767*** -0.679**   -0.627** 
LEVER_SQ 0.347   0.569* -0.149   0.046 
CR_RISK 0.176   0.234 0.28   0.253 
LN_SIZE 0.073***   0.061*** 0.071***   0.053*** 
HHI  -0.876  -0.870*  -0.028  0.041 
DUM_1998  -0.094**  -0.057*  -0.012  0.017 
DUM_2015  0.113**  0.089**  0.093  0.079 
GAP  -1.044***  -0.382*  -0.172  0.352 
DUM_OWN    0.045**   0.022 0.026 
DUM_DIS    -0.041**   -0.120*** -0.083*** 
DUM_FOR    0.046**   0.138*** 0.075*** 
DUM_GOV    0.015   0.061** 0.027 
CONSTANT 0.160* 0.931***  0.419*** 0.367*** 0.772*** 0.734*** 0.458*** 
Statistics         




0.27 0.06 0.10 0.31 0.21 0.01 0.18 0.27 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
The discrepancies between actual and predicted values for all three models are 
satisfyingly low (six, three and four percentage points on average for profit, cost and 
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Figure 2 Comparison of actual and predicted values of profit efficiency 
Legend: PREFF – Profit efficiency 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
 
Figure 3 Comparison of actual and predicted values of cost efficiency 
Legend: CEFF – Cost efficiency  
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Figure 4: Comparison of actual and predicted values of revenue efficiency 
Legend: REFF – Revenue efficiency 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
 
Figure 5 Scatter diagram between cost efficiency and leverage with quadratic fitted 
line 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Finally, using the whole sample for estimation of relationship between leverage 
and cost efficiency can be misleading for multiple reasons. First, our sample includes 
observations when banks just entered into the market and for the first year, they 
were financed almost exclusively through equity. Second, in some cases, when 
banks were in the process of leaving the market their leverage ratio was reduced to 
unusually high levels as they were gradually reducing their liabilities. Therefore, it 
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the leverage levels more typical for banks in Croatia (over 80%), which results in 
reduction of observations by 100. By increasing leverage from 80% to 90%, the cost 
efficiency is increasing leaving some room for agency theory to be valid on that part 
of the sample. However, on leverage levels higher than 90%, the relationship 
changes and increasing the leverage results with decreased cost efficiency (Figure 
5). Although our sample includes 21 years, the number of observations is still rather 
low, which does not allow for strong and definite statements about the validity of 
agency theory in the long run. 
 
Conclusions 
Although we acknowledge that banking industry is specific; highly leveraged and 
strictly regulated, its specificity is not the reason why the agency theory should not 
be valid. In this research we tested whether increasing debt leads to increased 
efficiency in Croatian banking sector in the period from 1994-2015. In order to 
operationalize the research a measure of profit efficiency consisting of cost and 
revenue efficiency was created and used as a proxy measure of manager effort. 
Initially, we found no evidence of existence of such costs as profit efficiency seems 
to be negatively correlated with leverage. 
By looking into the relationship between leverage and cost efficiency we found 
some evidence that agency theory may hold on "normal" levels of bank leverage 
(between 80% and 90%). In this range of leverage, increasing the leverage increases 
the cost efficiency of a bank. Our research is therefore to a certain extent 
comparable with the one provided by Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006), 
however there are a couple of significant differences between the two researches. 
Since we had far less observations at disposal, we were more inclined to use a linear 
programming technique to derive a profit efficiency measure. In addition, some of 
the governance related variables in our study were constructed in form of dummy 
variables as we have no time series of equity share of managers for Croatian banks 
as disposal. 
Regarding the specificity of Croatian banking market, it is important to mention 
that although banks in Croatia are public corporations and generally are traded at 
the stock exchange, they are usually owned by one dominant shareholder making 
the free-float as well as liquidity of their shares rather low. This is the reason why a lot 
of research related to agency theory is restricted for Croatian banking industry as 
certain variables are impossible to construct in consistent fashion (like Tobin q for 
franchise value). Having a rather undeveloped local capital market, banks in 
Croatia are used to "living without it", financing their operations directly either via 
owners (equity and debt) or in most cases from domestic non-financial sector 
deposits. Also, it is worth mentioning that often the decisions on bank leverage were 
made outside of the banks. For instance in 2006 and 2008 when Croatian national 
bank increased the risk weights for FX placements towards un-hedged borrowers, 
banks responded by recapitalisation. However, after 2008, there have been no 
significant recapitalisations on the market and dividend payout ratio has increased 
which together with reducing of deposits and loans from owners is actually creating 
disinvestment on the market. 
Additional research efforts would surely be welcomed in this area as further 
consolidation of the market is expected. A more detailed data on bank governance 
is possible to extract but would require a survey type of analysis going back into the 
past. Also, it could be beneficial to broaden the scope of the research and include 
either more financial institutions from Croatia (housing banks, insurers, etc.) or include 
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banks. Also, finding the relationship between bank leverage and efficiency, is not 
enough for testing the agency theory in banking industry as there are other theories 
explaining the relationship between those two phenomena as well (efficiency-risk 
hypothesis and the franchise-value hypothesis). Therefore, additional models should 
be constructed and accompanied by separate causality tests. 
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Figure A1: Selected indicators of bank performance 
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Figure A2: Bank leverage histogram 
Source: Authors` creation. 
 
Table A1: Correlation matrix between control variables 
 LEVER LEVER_SQ CR_RISK LN_SIZE HHI DUM_1998 
LEVER 1.00      
LEVER_SQ 0.98 1.00     
CR_RISK -0.11 -0.11 1.00    
LN_SIZE 0.62 0.65 -0.12 1.00   
HHI -0.01 0.01 -0.09 0.03 1.00  
DUM_1998 -0.05 -0.06 0.30 -0.09 -0.50 1.00 
DUM_2015 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.16 -0.05 
GAP -0.19 -0.19 0.01 -0.29 -0.04 -0.06 
DUM_OWN -0.28 -0.32 0.07 -0.41 -0.02 0.01 
DUM_DIS 0.19 0.19 0.04 -0.08 0.01 0.06 
DUM_FOR 0.07 0.09 -0.06 0.43 0.03 -0.09 
DUM_GOV 0.10 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.01 
 DUM_2015 GAP DUM_OWN DUM_DIS DUM_FOR DUM_GOV 
LEVER       
LEVER_SQ       
CR_RISK       
LN_SIZE       
HHI       
DUM_1998       
DUM_2015 1.00      
GAP -0.15 1.00     
DUM_OWN -0.03 0.03 1.00    
DUM_DIS -0.02 0.11 -0.15 1.00   
DUM_FOR 0.09 -0.22 -0.34 -0.21 1.00  
DUM_GOV -0.02 0.10 -0.17 0.00 -0.24 1.00 
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